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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Acceptance Insurance Co. ("Acceptance") brought this 
action seeking a declaratory judgment to resolve its rights 
and duties under an insurance policy issued to Mon Valley 
Steel Co. ("Mon Valley"). The policy in question was a 
general liability policy for the Clyde Mine, located in 
western Pennsylvania. Acceptance's potential liability arose 
as a result of an action against Mon Valley brought by the 
parents of Joelene Bowers, who was pushed to her death 
through an open shaft in the Clyde Mine. Acceptance 
sought to establish that the Clyde Mine insurance policy 
was effectively terminated prior to Joelene Bowers's death 
and, thus, that Acceptance is not obligated to provide a 
defense for Mon Valley or to pay for any recovery. 
 
The District Court entered summary judgment against 
Acceptance, holding that under regulations of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
("DEP"), the Clyde Mine policy could not effectively be 
canceled until the DEP was notified. The District Court 
further held that no reasonable jury could find from the 
undisputed facts that Acceptance had notified the DEP of 
its cancellation of the Clyde Mine policy and that therefore 
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the policy was still in effect at the time of Joelene Bowers's 
death. We hold that, under the applicable DEP regulations, 
notification was not a necessary precondition of 
cancellation. We therefore reverse. 
 
I. 
 
In 1994, Mon Valley contacted independent insurance 
broker Phillip Harvey of Phillip J. Harvey & Co., Inc. ("PJH 
& Co.") to obtain general liability insurance for mining 
operations at the Clyde Mine. Harvey contacted Tri-City 
Brokers ("Tri-City") to locate a policy. Through Tri-City's 
brokerage agreement with Acceptance Risk Managers, 
Acceptance's underwriters, Acceptance issued a policy to 
Mon Valley. 
 
On February 13, 1995, Acceptance issued a certificate of 
insurance to Mon Valley for a general liability policy 
covering the Clyde Mine. The policy's coverage was to be 
effective from December 7, 1994, through December 7, 
1995, and was subsequently extended through January 24, 
1996. The insurance policy contained no provision 
requiring Acceptance to notify the DEP before canceling the 
policy. 
 
Mon Valley's last valid permit to operate the Clyde Mine 
had expired on October 31, 1994, and Mon Valley had 
ceased all mining operations on approximately that date. 
Harvey, acting on Mon Valley's behalf, submitted the 
certificate of insurance to the DEP as proof of the requisite 
insurance coverage in support of Mon Valley's application 
for a renewal of its expired mining permit. On March 21, 
1995, and again on May 3, 1995, the DEP notified Mon 
Valley that its application for a mining license could not be 
processed because of several deficiencies in the application 
and the accompanying proof of insurance. Because Mon 
Valley did not make the necessary corrections or request an 
informal hearing, the DEP denied the license application on 
November 9, 1995. 
 
Mon Valley, which financed the policy through First 
Premium Services, Inc. ("First Premium"), never actually 
made a premium payment on the policy. On March 7, 
1995, First Premium used its power of attorney pursuant to 
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an agreement with Mon Valley to notify Acceptance to 
cancel the policy for nonpayment of premiums. Although it 
is not clear on what date Acceptance actually canceled the 
policy, it is undisputed that Acceptance took actions which, 
absent a statutory or regulatory bar, would have terminated 
the policy by July 15, 1995, at the latest. 
 
PJH & Co. had a general business practice of sending 
notices of cancellation to both certificate holders and state 
administrative agencies. Harvey testified that a notice of 
cancellation addressed to the DEP was present in PJH & 
Co.'s files. However, Harvey could not testify from personal 
knowledge concerning the actual preparation or mailing of 
the notice. Moreover, the DEP file on Mon Valley did not 
contain a copy of the notice. 
 
In March 1998, the Bowers commenced an action in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Greene County, Pennsylvania, 
captioned Bowers v. Mon Valley Steel Co., Inc., et al., Case 
No. AD-24 (1998) (the "Greene County suit"), to recover 
damages relating to the murder of Joelene Bowers at the 
Clyde Mine on January 19 or 20, 1996. Acceptance then 
brought the instant action, seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the Clyde Mine policy was effectively canceled prior to 
Joelene Bowers's death and that Acceptance therefore had 
no duty to defend or indemnify Mon Valley in connection 
with the Greene County suit. 
 
Following discovery, Acceptance moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts showed that 
the Clyde Mine policy had been effectively terminated prior 
to Joelene Bowers's death. Acceptance argued that it had 
no duty to notify the DEP prior to cancellation because no 
contractual provision, statute, or regulation specifically so 
required. In the alternative, Acceptance argued that, by 
application of the Pennsylvania "mailbox rule," the 
undisputed facts gave rise to a presumption that a notice of 
cancellation had been received by the DEP and that there 
was insufficient evidence in the record to rebut that 
presumption. 
 
The Bowerses and Utica also moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the applicable DEP regulations 
mandated that Acceptance notify the DEP before its 
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attempted cancellation became effective. The Bowerses and 
Utica also argued that Acceptance had not provided 
sufficient evidence to trigger the mailbox rule. 
The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and 
Recommendation, concluding that "the DEP's coal mining 
regulations establish a strict administrative scheme which 
unequivocally prohibits an insurer from cancelling a policy 
without first providing notification to the agency." R. & R. 
at 12, App. at 18. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Magistrate Judge relied on 25 Pa. Code S 86.168(d), which 
outlines the requirements for insurance policies submitted 
with a permit application. The Magistrate Judge also 
concluded that Acceptance had not adduced sufficient 
evidence to show that notice had been given to the DEP. 
The Magistrate Judge wrote that Acceptance "c[ould] not 
overcome this significant and undisputed fact: the DEP's 
license file for Mon Valley does not contain a cancellation 
notice." R. & R. at 13, App. at 19. Accordingly, the 
Magistrate Judge recommended that summary judgment be 
granted to Utica and the Bowerses. 
 
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's 
recommendation, and Acceptance then took this appeal. 
Our standard of review with respect to the grant of 
summary judgment is plenary. Waldorf v. Shuta , 896 F.2d 
723, 728 (3d Cir. 1990). The Appellees in this appeal are 
Utica Mutual Insurance Co. ("Utica"), the surety on 
reclamation and subsidence bonds posted on behalf of Mon 
Valley, and the Bowerses. 
 
II. 
 
Acceptance raises two issues on appeal. The first is 
whether the District Court erred in concluding that the 
DEP regulations require that a surface and underground 
coal mining general liability insurance carrier notify the 
DEP prior to canceling an insurance policy. The second 
issue is whether the District Court erred in concluding that 
the undisputed facts did not allow Acceptance to benefit 
from the presumption of receipt accorded to items placed in 
the mail under the Pennsylvania mailbox rule. We hold that 
Acceptance had no duty to notify the DEP before canceling 
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the policy, and we therefore need not reach the question 
whether Acceptance adduced sufficient evidence to take 
advantage of the Pennsylvania mailbox rule. 
 
A. 
 
Pursuant to the authority granted by the Pennsylvania 
Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act of May 
31, 1945, P.L. 1198, as amended, 52 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
SS 1396.1-1396.31, the DEP has issued regulations 
governing surface and underground coal mining and 
reclamation activities. See 25 Pa. CodeSS 86.1 et seq. 
Under these regulations, it is illegal to operate a coal mine 
in Pennsylvania without a permit from the DEP. See 25 Pa. 
Code S 86.11. Furthermore, 25 Pa. Code S 86.144 provides 
that an applicant for a coal mining permit must provide 
proof of adequate insurance: 
 
       86.144 Requirement to file a certification of liability 
       insurance. 
 
       Each applicant for a [mining] permit shall submit proof 
       to the Department [of Environmental Protection] of 
       liability insurance coverage for its mining and 
       reclamation operations issued by an insurance 
       company authorized to do business in this 
       Commonwealth. The amount, duration, form, 
       conditions, terms and method of proof of this 
       insurance coverage shall conform to [25 Pa. Code] 
       S 86.168 (relating to terms and conditions for liability 
       insurance). 
 
25 Pa. Code S 86.144. The regulations also outline the 
requirements of an applicant's insurance policy if a permit 
is to be granted: 
 
       86.168. Terms and conditions for liability insurance. 
 
       (a) A permittee shall submit proof of liability insurance 
       coverage before a permit or license is issued. The proof 
       may consist of either a certificate filed at the time of 
       license application and renewal thereof, or, otherwise 
       annually filed with the Department certifying that the 
       permittee has a public liability insurance policy in force 
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       covering all of the permittee's mining and reclamation 
       operations in this Commonwealth. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (d) The insurance shall include a rider requiring that the 
       insurer notify the Department 30 days prior to 
       substantive changes being made in the policy, or prior 
       to termination or failure to renew. 
 
25 Pa. Code SS 86.168(a), (d) (emphasis added). 
 
B. 
 
Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to 
interpret the regulation in question in this appeal,"we 
must predict how the state court would resolve these issues 
should it be called upon to do so." Wiley v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 457, 459 (3d Cir. 1993). We predict 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would interpret this 
regulatory scheme, and specifically S 86.168(d), to mean 
that Acceptance had no duty to inform the DEP of the 
cancellation unless the insurance policy itself created a 
duty to do so. Although the DEP presumably could have 
issued a regulation directly requiring an insurer to notify 
the DEP of cancellation of a mining insurance policy, the 
DEP has not done so. 
 
Unless a statute or regulation imposes some additional 
requirement, "[w]here the right to cancel an insurance 
policy is expressly reserved in the contract itself, then the 
extent of the right and the conditions upon which it may be 
exercised must be determined by reference to the contract." 
Clairton City Sch. Dist. v. Mary, 541 A.2d 849, 851 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1988) (citing Hanna v. Reliance Ins. Co., 166 
A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1961)). Neither Utica nor the Bowerses 
argue that Acceptance failed to cancel the policy in 
accordance with the policy's cancellation clause. Nor do 
they contend that the policy contained the requisite rider or 
any language equivalent to what was contained therein. 
Rather, they argue that S 86.168(d) is ambiguous and that 
we should interpret it to require notice to the DEP. 
 
Pennsylvania has adopted the canon of statutory 
construction that courts of the Commonwealth must 
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interpret unambiguous statutes according to their terms. 
See 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1921(b) (Purdon's 1995); 
Anthony v. Koppers Co., 436 A.2d 181, 183 (Pa. 1991). 
When interpreting a Pennsylvania statute, we are to give 
the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning. 
Commonwealth v. Neckerauer, 617 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1992); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 612 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992). The words are to be considered in their 
grammatical context. 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1930 
(Purdon's 1995). Moreover, 
 
       sections of statutes are not to be isolated from the 
       context in which they arise such that an individual 
       interpretation is accorded one section which does not 
       take into account the related sections of the same 
       statute. Statutes do not exist sentence by sentence. 
       Their sections and sentences comprise a composite of 
       their stated purpose. 
 
Commonwealth v. Lurie, 569 A.2d 329, 331 (Pa. 1990) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Revtai, 532 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 1987)). 
These same principles of statutory construction apply to 
DEP regulations as well. See 1 Pa. CodeS 1.7; Bush v. Pa. 
Horse Racing Comm'n, 466 A.2d 254, 255-56 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1983). 
 
Instead of directly requiring that insurers notify the DEP 
upon cancellation of a policy, the text of S 86.168(d) 
provides that a permit applicant must secure a policy 
having a rider mandating notice to the DEP in the event of 
cancellation. The pertinent parts of S 86.168, read in 
conjunction, require the following: "A permittee shall 
submit proof of liability coverage . . . . The insurance shall 
include a rider requiring that the insurer notify the 
Department 30 days prior to substantive changes being 
made in the policy, or prior to termination or failure to 
renew." SS 86.168(a)-(d). The plain meaning of SS 86.168(a) 
and (d) is that the permittee must obtain suitable insurance 
in order to obtain a permit and that the insurance, in order 
to be suitable, must contain a rider requiring notice to the 
DEP. Section 86.168(d) places no direct obligation on the 
insurer. Indeed, when viewed in light of S 86.168(a), all of 
the provisions of S 86.168 speak to the obligations of 
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permittees and permit applicants -- not to the obligations 
of insurers. 
 
Moreover, if, as Utica and the Bowerses argue, the 
regulation did directly require that the insurer provide 
notice, the requirement that a rider be included in the 
policy would be superfluous. "Such an interpretation would 
defy the axiom of statutory construction that `whenever 
possible each word in a statutory provision is to be given 
meaning and not to be treated as surplusage.' " 
Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 722 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. 1998) 
(quoting In re Employees of Student Servs., 432 A.2d 189, 
195 (Pa. 1981)). The more logical explanation is that the 
DEP chose to place the burden on the insured to have the 
rider included in the policy and to have the policy form the 
basis of the insurer's duty. Thus, S 86.144 states that if the 
applicant wishes to have its application for a mining permit 
approved, "the amount, duration, form, conditions, terms, 
and method of proof of this insurance shall conform to 
S 86.168." This shows that the burden is on the permit 
applicant to have the rider placed in the insurance 
contract. Similarly, the requirement that proof of suitable 
insurance be submitted with a permit application suggests 
that DEP's means of ensuring that it receives notice of 
cancellation is to deny any permit application that is not 
accompanied by an insurance policy imposing such a duty 
on the insurer. If the interpretation of S 86.168(d) advanced 
by Utica and Bowers were correct, the DEP would have no 
need to deny a permit application that was not 
accompanied by such a policy. 
 
In concluding that the regulation itself imposed a notice 
requirement, the Magistrate Judge relied in part on 2 Couch 
on Insurance S 31:19 (3d ed. 1996), which states that 
"[w]here statutory provisions require notice to a government 
agency in order to effect a cancellation of policy, such 
notice must be given to effect a cancellation, and conversely 
there is no cancellation where notice is given merely in 
accordance with the provisions of the policy." This 
statement is inapplicable to Acceptance's situation. Section 
31:19 concerns the effect of the failure to notify a 
government agency "[w]here statutory provisions require 
notice to a government agency in order to effect a 
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cancellation of a policy." As discussed above, the relevant 
regulations here do not require notice to the DEP to effect 
a cancellation of the policy. Rather, the regulations require 
that policies contain notification riders. It is noteworthy 
that none of the cases cited in Couch involved a situation 
analogous to the one here, i.e., a situation in which the 
law, rather than directly requiring the insurer to provide 
notice, required a notification rider to be included in the 
policy. 
 
For similar reasons, Metro Transportation Co. v. North 
Star Reinsurance Co., 912 F.2d 672 (3d Cir. 1990), on 
which Utica and the Bowers rely, is not apposite. In Metro 
Transportation, we noted that "whenever a statute or 
insurance policy provides for notice of cancellation , 
Pennsylvania law has mandated that an insurer's failure to 
comply with the provisions of the notice of cancellation 
results in the continuation of coverage regardless of any 
prescribed date of expiration." Id. at 682 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). We do not question that, if S 86.168(d) 
directly required Acceptance to provide notice of 
cancellation, then a failure to provide notice would have 
made an attempted cancellation ineffective. However, the 
principle of Pennsylvania law stated in Metro Transportation 
does not apply where, as in this case, there is no statute or 
regulation requiring notification.1 And, as we have stated, 
the policy contains no such requirement. We will not 
convert a statutory requirement of a rider into a mandate 
that the requisite language be deemed to be implicated in 
the policy if the rider is not in fact attached. 
 
Our analysis of the text of S 86.168(d) is confirmed by a 
survey of analogous Pennsylvania regulations. In other 
similar areas, the DEP has explicitly placed the burden of 
giving notice directly on insurers. For example, the DEP has 
a permit system for the handling and disposing of residual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The regulation in question in Metro Transportation required a taxi 
company to file a Uniform Carrier Bodily Injury and Property Damage 
Certificate of Insurance, known as a "Form E." "Form E . . . [itself] 
states 
that the insurance policy -- and hence the coverage provided by the 
policy -- cannot be canceled without first giving[the Pennsylvania Public 
Utility Commission] thirty days [sic] notice." Id. at 678. 
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waste. See 25 Pa. Code S 287.1 et seq.. Section 287.101 
outlines the requirements for receiving a permit. One of the 
requirements is that an applicant must "comply with the 
. . . insurance requirements of Subchapter E." Section 
287.375, part of Subchapter E, states: 
 
       (b) The operator shall submit proof of insurance under 
       S 287.373 (relating to proof of insurance coverage) . . . . 
 
       (c) The insurer may cancel or otherwise terminate an 
       insurance policy by sending 60 days or other period 
       prior written notice as may be authorized by the 
       Insurance Department, to the Department and the 
       operator, of the insurer's intention to cancel or otherwise 
       terminate the insurance policy. The notice shall be sent 
       to the Department and the insured by certified mail, 
       return receipt requested. Prior to the cancellation or 
       termination becoming effective, the operator shall 
       provide the Department with proof of a replacement 
       insurance policy sufficient to meet the requirements of 
       this subchapter. 
 
25 Pa. Code S 287.375(b)-(c) (emphasis added). This 
provision contrasts sharply with the regulation at issue in 
the present case. Whereas 25 Pa. Code S 287.375(c) places 
an obligation directly on the insurer to provide notice 
regardless of the provisions of the policy, 25 Pa. Code 
S 86.168 places an obligation on an applicant to have a 
rider requiring notice placed in the insurance contract. See 
also 25 Pa. Code S 271.383(f)(2) (regulating municipal waste 
management); 25 Pa. Code S 271.392 (g)(2) (same). 
 
Finally, we note that our interpretation of the regulation 
is consistent with what we perceive to be the Legislature's 
objective, viz., ensuring that mining operations are not 
conducted without the type of insurance deemed by the 
Legislature to be necessary.2 That goal is fulfilled by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Consideration of legislative intent is not necessary in this case since 
the Pennsylvania legislature has provided that "[w]hen the words of a 
statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to 
be 
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa. Code 
S 1922(b). However, we merely reconcile our interpretation with the 
general intent of the regulatory scheme in order to ensure that we 
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requiring that the party applying for the mining permit 
obtain liability insurance. See SS 86.67, 86.144. If the 
applicant has not obtained an insurance policy with a rider 
requiring notice of cancellation, the application should be 
rejected, and the applicant may not legally conduct a 
mining operation. See id. Thus, assuming that the DEP 
ensures that mining operations are not conducted without 
a permit, notification to the DEP of the cancellation of a 
policy is not necessary to prevent uninsured parties from 
conducting mining operations. Cf. Metro Transp. , 912 F.2d 
at 681 (goal of notice requirement for cancellation of 
automobile insurance policy for taxis is so that the State 
may revoke the taxi license if the insurance is canceled). 
 
III. 
 
In sum, we hold that, under Pennsylvania law, a surface 
and underground coal mining general liability insurance 
carrier has a no duty to notify the DEP before effectively 
canceling an insurance policy unless a notification 
provision is included in the insurance policy. We therefore 
reverse the District Court's July 17, 2000, order granting 
summary judgment against Acceptance and remand this 
case to the District Court for entry of an order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Acceptance. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
effectuate the Pennsylvania Legislature's other mandates that (1) "[t]he 
object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain 
and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly," 1 Pa. Code 
S 1921(a); and (2) "the General Assembly does not intend a result that is 
absurd," 1 Pa. Code S 1922(1). 
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